Worried about crypto exchange losses? Don’t pay money for “help” recovering money
This article was originally posted by the FTC. See the original article here.
Brought to you by Dr. Ware, Microsoft Office 365 Silver Partner, Charleston SC.
This article was originally posted by the FTC. See the original article here.
Brought to you by Dr. Ware, Microsoft Office 365 Silver Partner, Charleston SC.
This article was originally posted by the FTC. See the original article here.
Brought to you by Dr. Ware, Microsoft Office 365 Silver Partner, Charleston SC.
This article is contributed. See the original author and article here.
CISA released one Industrial Control Systems (ICS) advisory on November 15, 2022. This advisory provides timely information about current security issues, vulnerabilities, and exploits surrounding ICS.
CISA encourages users and administrators to review the newly released ICS advisory for technical details and mitigations:
This article was originally posted by the FTC. See the original article here.
Brought to you by Dr. Ware, Microsoft Office 365 Silver Partner, Charleston SC.
This article is contributed. See the original author and article here.
This report is provided “as is” for informational purposes only. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) does not provide any warranties of any kind regarding any information contained herein. The DHS does not endorse any commercial product or service referenced in this bulletin or otherwise.
This document is marked TLP:CLEAR–Disclosure is not limited. Sources may use TLP:CLEAR when information carries minimal or no foreseeable risk of misuse, in accordance with applicable rules and procedures for public release. Subject to standard copyright rules, TLP:CLEAR information may be distributed without restriction. For more information on the Traffic Light Protocol (TLP), see http://www.cisa.gov/tlp.
CISA received 3 Java Server Pages (JSP) webshells for analysis from an organization where cyber actors exploited vulnerabilities against Zimbra Collaboration Suite (ZCS). Four CVEs are currently being leveraged against ZCS: CVE-2022-24682, CVE-2022-27924, CVE-2022-27925 chained with CVE-2022-37042, and CVE-2022-30333. The files are server side code that allow clients to remotely send commands to be executed on the victim web server.
For more information on cyber actors exploiting vulnerabilities in ZCS, see joint CSA: Threat Actors Exploiting Multiple CVEs Against Zimbra Collaboration Suite.
Download the PDF version of this report: MAR-10410305.r1.v1.CLEAR, 537 KB
14bf0cbee88507fb016d01e3ced053858410c389be022d2aa4d075287c781c4a (hiall.jsp)
814a169ba97b168f95af3340b60a6fec1f29c87be89226b1966d9b0abfb19a15 (aes.jsp)
bc5b1f588cd506a69c03a7980a363846fa474b78e6946fa90e58d735c65f2bb6 (cmd.jsp)
backdoortrojanwebshell
Name | cmd.jsp |
---|---|
Size | 976 bytes |
Type | HTML document, ASCII text, with very long lines, with no line terminators |
MD5 | 91de296c801db00a24a2832b5e12d345 |
SHA1 | 010aee65009b9faeb3a4e24ca777d3aaa51b0bd3 |
SHA256 | bc5b1f588cd506a69c03a7980a363846fa474b78e6946fa90e58d735c65f2bb6 |
SHA512 | 673a100072df4be4bb73828dde5b04d68b3aa59a78f1af42594e5771620ad4205389ff4d83456faa5262cd780e69deef7f34fe03757531cabb7faac093ad2546 |
ssdeep | 24:gzYIRLk+nn9IH/v+xVnVjQ4vajJHG3c3FvcVsUveakUSg:gh9cgVGo3c9cuakvg |
Entropy | 5.251748 |
ESET | Java/JSP.AC trojan |
---|---|
Trend Micro | Backdoo.E99CED14 |
Trend Micro HouseCall | Backdoo.E99CED14 |
No matches found.
This file is a JSP webshell that also allows file upload to the victim web server. If the client request body contains “c=”, the script reads the contents of the body starting from the third character and executes it as a command in a separate process. The output from that command is sent back to the client.
If the client request body does not contain “c=” and is not an empty string, the script will attempt to write a file on the victim web server. The script assumes that the request body is in the following format and parses its contents accordingly: “{file directory} n={filename} b={data encoded in base64}”. The script decodes the base64 encoded data, and writes it to the location specified by the file directory and filename values obtained from the client request body. If the file upload was successful, confirmation is sent back to the client.
Figure 1 – The snippet of code that parses the client request body for the command to execute on the victim web server.
Figure 2 – The snippet of code that parses the contents of the client request body to upload a file onto the victim web server.
webshell
Name | hiall.jsp |
---|---|
Size | 673 bytes |
Type | ASCII text, with very long lines, with no line terminators |
MD5 | 6acf93001a61f325e17a6f0f49caf5d1 |
SHA1 | ab479f3054a3d9d596fd2c73985120e5817912f3 |
SHA256 | 14bf0cbee88507fb016d01e3ced053858410c389be022d2aa4d075287c781c4a |
SHA512 | bd631f24c22f18c30912f0af9cd0638d7255989c1ea08f3368039e5978633b0c70cd4de78bc81eea60c224001b371ce44c35a34a0bda5a2d4d66ed5d289e3796 |
ssdeep | 12:6/ecRT876QQFN+d6qq0oyDhDRd6rA2TTm2Fb4PloBhXhMNj/Krxa+d0JK32Qt:CT8eH86qRoyF60v4bCloBcur076 |
Entropy | 5.491932 |
No matches found.
No matches found.
This file is a JSP webshell. It reads the value of the parameter named “raw” in the client request, which ends up being the shell command that gets run. Based on the file separator character, the script detects whether the operating system (OS) is Windows or Linux. If the value of “raw” is not null and the OS is Windows, it starts a new process with the command “cmd /C {value of raw}”. If the value of “raw” is not null and the OS is Linux, it starts a new process with the command “/bin/bash -c {value of raw}”. Since the client sends in the value of “raw”, it controls what gets run in the shell. Lastly, the output of the command gets printed on the webpage for the client to see.
Figure 3 – A snippet of code that takes the data the client sent and uses ProcessBuilder to execute the data as shell commands.
backdoortrojanwebshell
Name | aes.jsp |
---|---|
Size | 867 bytes |
Type | HTML document, ASCII text |
MD5 | 5b739059ebb590df7bc7ed33c8d62531 |
SHA1 | 48e520d4705ae143783f1375e384eb793fb2b513 |
SHA256 | 814a169ba97b168f95af3340b60a6fec1f29c87be89226b1966d9b0abfb19a15 |
SHA512 | db9bd83387037cfdc3567d8b351e85f1d135f80ee30b99cd526206d1d7cca62ac3c6868700f244debf2ba8763846d288eb3528a5b254f3861c7459cb47cf9349 |
ssdeep | 12:e8dq1ctsjn9eARWTNEhRTCKp9n/UXRTq7NeqTq/v2aW+YDQ3qTqa:1gJj9eKWTmHTPfcTqnTqH1YDfTqa |
Entropy | 5.166005 |
AhnLab | WebShell/JSP.Small.S1403 |
---|---|
ESET | Java/Webshell.K trojan |
IKARUS | Backdoor.PHP.Remoteshell |
McAfee | JSP/BackDoor.g |
Quick Heal | ASP.Webshell.45634 |
Sophos | Troj/WebShel-BB |
No matches found.
This file is a JSP webshell. When initially loaded, there will be a text box and a button named “Send”. The client can type anything in the text box. Clicking the “Send” button will submit the form and send the request to the web server. The string in the text box is sent over in the request parameter “cmd”. If the “cmd” parameter is not null when the web server receives the request, the script will detect the OS type. If the OS is Windows, it starts a new process with the command “cmd /C {value of cmd}”. If the OS is Linux, it starts a new process with the command “{value of cmd}”. Since the client determines the value of “cmd”, it controls what gets run in the shell. Lastly, the command that ran and the output of that command gets printed on the webpage for the client to see.
Figure 4 – This is what the resulting webpage looks like when the “cmd” parameter in the client request was “echo hello”.
CISA recommends that users and administrators consider using the following best practices to strengthen the security posture of their organization’s systems. Any configuration changes should be reviewed by system owners and administrators prior to implementation to avoid unwanted impacts.
Additional information on malware incident prevention and handling can be found in National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Special Publication 800-83, “Guide to Malware Incident Prevention & Handling for Desktops and Laptops”.
CISA continuously strives to improve its products and services. You can help by answering a very short series of questions about this product at the following URL: https://us-cert.cisa.gov/forms/feedback/
What is a MIFR? A Malware Initial Findings Report (MIFR) is intended to provide organizations with malware analysis in a timely manner. In most instances this report will provide initial indicators for computer and network defense. To request additional analysis, please contact CISA and provide information regarding the level of desired analysis.
What is a MAR? A Malware Analysis Report (MAR) is intended to provide organizations with more detailed malware analysis acquired via manual reverse engineering. To request additional analysis, please contact CISA and provide information regarding the level of desired analysis.
Can I edit this document? This document is not to be edited in any way by recipients. All comments or questions related to this document should be directed to the CISA at 1-888-282-0870 or CISA Service Desk.
Can I submit malware to CISA? Malware samples can be submitted via three methods:
CISA encourages you to report any suspicious activity, including cybersecurity incidents, possible malicious code, software vulnerabilities, and phishing-related scams. Reporting forms can be found on CISA’s homepage at www.cisa.gov.
This article is contributed. See the original author and article here.
Today CISA published its guide on Stakeholder-Specific Vulnerability Categorization (SSVC), a vulnerability management methodology that assesses vulnerabilities and prioritizes remediation efforts based on exploitation status, impacts to safety, and prevalence of the affected product in a singular system.
As stated in Executive Assistant Director (EAD) Eric Goldstein’s blog post Transforming the Vulnerability Management Landscape, implementing a methodology, such as SSVC, is a critical step to advancing the vulnerability management ecosystem. Additionally, the blog details advances—including
CISA’s Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog, Common Security Advisory Framework (CSAF) machine-readable security advisories, and the Vulnerability Exploitability eXchange (VEX)—that, used in conjunction with SSVC, will reduce the window cyber threat actors have to exploit networks.
CISA encourages organizations to read EAD Goldstein’s blog post and to use the following resources on the SSVC webpage to strengthen their vulnerability management processes:
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