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Notification
This report is provided “as is” for informational purposes only. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) does not provide any warranties of any kind regarding any information contained herein. The DHS does not endorse any commercial product or service referenced in this bulletin or otherwise.
This document is marked TLP:WHITE–Disclosure is not limited. Sources may use TLP:WHITE when information carries minimal or no foreseeable risk of misuse, in accordance with applicable rules and procedures for public release. Subject to standard copyright rules, TLP:WHITE information may be distributed without restriction. For more information on the Traffic Light Protocol (TLP), see http://www.cisa.gov/tlp.
Summary
Description
CISA received two Common Gateway Interface (CGI) scripts for analysis. The two CGI scripts are Pulse Secure system files that were modified by a malicious actor. The files contain a malicious modification which allows the attacker to maintain remote command and control (C2) access to a target system. This analysis is derived from malicious files found on Pulse Connect Secure devices.
For a downloadable copy of indicators of compromise, see: MAR-10336935-2.v1.stix.
Submitted Files (2)
c287cd9e3c37f5869dbce168a89a78836a61791a72b36d048c086576b9af2769 (licenseserverproto.cgi)
d27730060be3099846a673cfee890da05dc9f7b34d987c65f4299980b6865822 (licenseserverproto.cgi)
Findings
d27730060be3099846a673cfee890da05dc9f7b34d987c65f4299980b6865822
Tags
backdoortrojan
Details
Name | licenseserverproto.cgi |
---|---|
Size | 3377 bytes |
Type | Perl script text executable |
MD5 | ae76be46d7e1ca140cf4d30d5a60d407 |
SHA1 | 0dc2f82d9392b9b0646fa65523e2da712a401e99 |
SHA256 | d27730060be3099846a673cfee890da05dc9f7b34d987c65f4299980b6865822 |
SHA512 | 29f46f49a3d700d1f8b88df8d20eed3a834fccaf0057754d465cd27017332dd9ef2efc47c49315091d55d1c0afdbb14b433a4a3458372e74ae24f0524fccc664 |
ssdeep | 48:ErLYmeAJAZo6HMeQT808inRbxhcQjQkBQVeWo7BuswT4o7oo7vpBBBQWBZ7zSH74:EfYkJAZnqpxhcOQVHo0v/wO27YJ |
Entropy | 5.316307 |
Antivirus
No matches found.
YARA Rules
No matches found.
ssdeep Matches
91 | ade49335dd276f96fe3ba89de5eb02ea380901b5ef60ff6311235b6318c57f66 |
---|---|
97 | c287cd9e3c37f5869dbce168a89a78836a61791a72b36d048c086576b9af2769 |
Description
This is a CGI script that was maliciously modified (Figure 1) from a Pulse Secure system file. The malicious form accepts a command of no more than 45 characters in length. The script executes the provided command on the compromised system using the system function.
Screenshots
Figure 1 – Screenshot of the dependencies and the malicious main() function patched into the Pulse Secure file.
c287cd9e3c37f5869dbce168a89a78836a61791a72b36d048c086576b9af2769
Tags
backdoortrojan
Details
Name | licenseserverproto.cgi |
---|---|
Size | 3378 bytes |
Type | Perl script text executable |
MD5 | bff36121c5e6b7fdce02d5b076aee54e |
SHA1 | 45284d5ccc85e76f566ec25d46696ddb4eb861c0 |
SHA256 | c287cd9e3c37f5869dbce168a89a78836a61791a72b36d048c086576b9af2769 |
SHA512 | f6b51f28ebcad247f8910cb357a8f9f40a6d44262c9d00524651d04ff078612498dbf311e27184ad1f2f8ccc4a538bc851899b56769f0a90a48cf76c7150d601 |
ssdeep | 48:EbLYmeAJAZo6HMeQT808inRZxhcQjQkBQVeWo7BuswT4o7oo7vpBBBQWBZ7zSH74:EvYkJAZnqPxhcOQVHo0v/wO27YJ |
Entropy | 5.316014 |
Antivirus
No matches found.
YARA Rules
No matches found.
ssdeep Matches
90 | ade49335dd276f96fe3ba89de5eb02ea380901b5ef60ff6311235b6318c57f66 |
---|---|
97 | d27730060be3099846a673cfee890da05dc9f7b34d987c65f4299980b6865822 |
Description
This is a CGI script with same malicious modification as the file “licenseserverproto.cgi” (d27730060be3099846a673cfee890da05dc9f7b34d987c65f4299980b6865822).
Screenshots
Figure 2 – Screenshot of the dependencies and the malicious main() function added to the Pulse Secure file.
Recommendations
CISA recommends that users and administrators consider using the following best practices to strengthen the security posture of their organization’s systems. Any configuration changes should be reviewed by system owners and administrators prior to implementation to avoid unwanted impacts.
- Maintain up-to-date antivirus signatures and engines.
- Keep operating system patches up-to-date.
- Disable File and Printer sharing services. If these services are required, use strong passwords or Active Directory authentication.
- Restrict users’ ability (permissions) to install and run unwanted software applications. Do not add users to the local administrators group unless required.
- Enforce a strong password policy and implement regular password changes.
- Exercise caution when opening e-mail attachments even if the attachment is expected and the sender appears to be known.
- Enable a personal firewall on agency workstations, configured to deny unsolicited connection requests.
- Disable unnecessary services on agency workstations and servers.
- Scan for and remove suspicious e-mail attachments; ensure the scanned attachment is its “true file type” (i.e., the extension matches the file header).
- Monitor users’ web browsing habits; restrict access to sites with unfavorable content.
- Exercise caution when using removable media (e.g., USB thumb drives, external drives, CDs, etc.).
- Scan all software downloaded from the Internet prior to executing.
- Maintain situational awareness of the latest threats and implement appropriate Access Control Lists (ACLs).
Additional information on malware incident prevention and handling can be found in National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Special Publication 800-83, “Guide to Malware Incident Prevention & Handling for Desktops and Laptops”.
Contact Information
CISA continuously strives to improve its products and services. You can help by answering a very short series of questions about this product at the following URL: https://us-cert.cisa.gov/forms/feedback/
Document FAQ
What is a MIFR? A Malware Initial Findings Report (MIFR) is intended to provide organizations with malware analysis in a timely manner. In most instances this report will provide initial indicators for computer and network defense. To request additional analysis, please contact CISA and provide information regarding the level of desired analysis.
What is a MAR? A Malware Analysis Report (MAR) is intended to provide organizations with more detailed malware analysis acquired via manual reverse engineering. To request additional analysis, please contact CISA and provide information regarding the level of desired analysis.
Can I edit this document? This document is not to be edited in any way by recipients. All comments or questions related to this document should be directed to the CISA at 1-888-282-0870 or CISA Service Desk.
Can I submit malware to CISA? Malware samples can be submitted via three methods:
CISA encourages you to report any suspicious activity, including cybersecurity incidents, possible malicious code, software vulnerabilities, and phishing-related scams. Reporting forms can be found on CISA’s homepage at www.cisa.gov.
Brought to you by Dr. Ware, Microsoft Office 365 Silver Partner, Charleston SC.
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