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Summary
Description
CISA received one unique file for analysis. This file is a malicious 32-bit Windows Portable Executable (PE). During runtime, this malware attempts to overwrite the victim user’s files with null bytes. The malware also attempts to overwrite the Master Boot Record of attached drives with null bytes, thereby corrupting them and rendering it impossible for the victim to access the victim’s stored data.
For a downloadable copy of IOCs, see: MAR-10376640-2.v1.stix.
Submitted Files (1)
a294620543334a721a2ae8eaaf9680a0786f4b9a216d75b55cfd28f39e9430ea (a294620543334a721a2ae8eaaf9680…)
Findings
a294620543334a721a2ae8eaaf9680a0786f4b9a216d75b55cfd28f39e9430ea
Tags
trojanviruswiper
Details
| Name | a294620543334a721a2ae8eaaf9680a0786f4b9a216d75b55cfd28f39e9430ea |
|---|---|
| Size | 9216 bytes |
| Type | PE32 executable (GUI) Intel 80386, for MS Windows |
| MD5 | 42e52b8daf63e6e26c3aa91e7e971492 |
| SHA1 | 98b3fb74b3e8b3f9b05a82473551c5a77b576d54 |
| SHA256 | a294620543334a721a2ae8eaaf9680a0786f4b9a216d75b55cfd28f39e9430ea |
| SHA512 | b21039ad67e07a77bbcfe73a89afd22c7e1fd782a5293c41edd0ae1dbd75c4fdf6404d8cfe5cf2191ad1822e32877ded1675e48895e8b9898778855d3dd56636 |
| ssdeep | 192:76f0CW5P2Io4evFrDv2ZRJzCn7URRsjVJaZF:76fPWl24evFrT2ZR5Cn7UR0VJo |
| Entropy | 5.108650 |
Antivirus
| AhnLab | Trojan/Win.Agent |
|---|---|
| Avira | TR/Crypt.XPACK.Gen |
| Bitdefender | Gen:Variant.CaddyWiper.2 |
| ClamAV | Win.Malware.CaddyWiper-9941573-1 |
| Cyren | W32/Trojan.WXHP-9071 |
| ESET | Win32/KillDisk.NCX trojan |
| Emsisoft | Gen:Variant.CaddyWiper.2 (B) |
| IKARUS | Trojan.Win32.KillDisk |
| K7 | Trojan ( 0058f88b1 ) |
| Lavasoft | Gen:Trojan.Heur.FU.amW@aiAsbgg |
| McAfee | Trojan-caddywiper.b |
| NANOAV | Virus.Win32.Gen.ccmw |
| Quick Heal | SM.mal.generic |
| Sophos | Troj/KillDisk-G |
| Symantec | Trojan.Gen.MBT |
| TACHYON | Trojan/W32.Agent.9216.ABY |
| Trend Micro | Trojan.F383D2EE |
| Trend Micro HouseCall | Trojan.F383D2EE |
| Vir.IT eXplorer | Trojan.Win32.CaddyWiper.DGP |
| VirusBlokAda | Trojan.DoS.CaddyBlade |
| Zillya! | Trojan.KillDisk.Win32.311 |
YARA Rules
- rule CISA_10376640_04 : trojan wiper CADDYWIPER
{
meta:
Author = “CISA Code & Media Analysis”
Incident = “10376640”
Date = “2022-03-23”
Last_Modified = “20220324_1700”
Actor = “n/a”
Category = “Trojan Wiper”
Family = “CADDYWIPER”
Description = “Detects Caddy wiper samples”
MD5_1 = “42e52b8daf63e6e26c3aa91e7e971492”
SHA256_1 = “a294620543334a721a2ae8eaaf9680a0786f4b9a216d75b55cfd28f39e9430ea”
strings:
$s0 = { 44 73 52 6F 6C 65 47 65 74 50 72 69 6D 61 72 79 44 6F 6D 61 69 6E }
$s1 = { 50 C6 45 A1 00 C6 45 A2 48 C6 45 A3 00 C6 45 A4 59 C6 }
$s2 = { C6 45 A6 53 C6 45 A7 00 C6 45 A8 49 C6 }
$s3 = { C6 45 B0 44 C6 45 B1 00 C6 45 B2 52 }
$s4 = { C6 45 B8 45 C6 45 B9 00 C6 45 BA 39 }
$s5 = { C6 45 AC 43 C6 45 AD 3A C6 45 AE 5C C6 45 AF }
$s6 = { 55 C6 45 B0 73 C6 45 B1 65 C6 45 B2 72 C6 45 B3 }
$s7 = { C6 45 E0 44 C6 45 E1 3A C6 45 E2 5C C6 45 E3 }
$s8 = { 21 54 68 69 73 20 70 72 6F 67 72 61 6D 20 63 61 6E 6E 6F }
condition:
all of them
}
ssdeep Matches
No matches found.
PE Metadata
| Compile Date | 2022-03-14 03:19:36-04:00 |
|---|---|
| Import Hash | ea8609d4dad999f73ec4b6f8e7b28e55 |
PE Sections
| MD5 | Name | Raw Size | Entropy |
|---|---|---|---|
| 6194652d04e28dad063a1b6e60d110ab | header | 1024 | 1.873192 |
| f0d4c11521fc3891965534e6c52e128b | .text | 7168 | 5.644240 |
| d4b14cf770a6e660ba6a6e63f7c22451 | .rdata | 512 | 0.988058 |
| 0f1286f7c8817e0974ddc3ce1edc1b59 | .reloc | 512 | 0.081539 |
Packers/Compilers/Cryptors
| Borland Delphi 3.0 (???) |
Description
This file is a 32 bit Windows PE that has been identified as a variant of the malware family known as Caddy Wiper. Static analysis of this application indicates its primary purpose is to destroy victim user data. First the malware attempts to enumerate all files in the directory “C:Users”. The malware will then attempt to recursively overwrite files that it can access in this directory with null bytes, effectively “zeroing” the files out.
The malware will then attempt to access drives attached to the target system, starting with the drive “D:”, and recursively “zero” out all the files it can access on those drives too. Finally, the malware attempts to use the API DeviceIoControl to directly access the physical memory of attached drives. If it is able to access these drives, the malware will zero out the first 1920 bytes of the physical drives, effectively wiping its Master Boot Record and corrupting the drive.
Screenshots
Figure 1. – This screenshot illustrates the main structure of the malware. As illustrated, the malware’s main purpose is to recursively overwrite victim user’s files and physical drives with null bytes.
Figure 2. – Structure that malware uses to build null buffer. This buffer is utilized to overwrite the victim user’s target files.
Figure 3. – Malware trying to zero out .PHYSICALDRIVE7
Figure 4. – Malware trying to zero out .PHYSICALDRIVE4
Figure 5. – Malware trying to zero out .PHYSICALDRIVE3
Figure 6. – Malware attempting to zero out first 1920 bytes of a physical drive attached to the target system.
Recommendations
CISA recommends that users and administrators consider using the following best practices to strengthen the security posture of their organization’s systems. Any configuration changes should be reviewed by system owners and administrators prior to implementation to avoid unwanted impacts.
- Maintain up-to-date antivirus signatures and engines.
- Keep operating system patches up-to-date.
- Disable File and Printer sharing services. If these services are required, use strong passwords or Active Directory authentication.
- Restrict users’ ability (permissions) to install and run unwanted software applications. Do not add users to the local administrators group unless required.
- Enforce a strong password policy and implement regular password changes.
- Exercise caution when opening e-mail attachments even if the attachment is expected and the sender appears to be known.
- Enable a personal firewall on agency workstations, configured to deny unsolicited connection requests.
- Disable unnecessary services on agency workstations and servers.
- Scan for and remove suspicious e-mail attachments; ensure the scanned attachment is its “true file type” (i.e., the extension matches the file header).
- Monitor users’ web browsing habits; restrict access to sites with unfavorable content.
- Exercise caution when using removable media (e.g., USB thumb drives, external drives, CDs, etc.).
- Scan all software downloaded from the Internet prior to executing.
- Maintain situational awareness of the latest threats and implement appropriate Access Control Lists (ACLs).
Additional information on malware incident prevention and handling can be found in National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Special Publication 800-83, “Guide to Malware Incident Prevention & Handling for Desktops and Laptops”.
Contact Information
CISA continuously strives to improve its products and services. You can help by answering a very short series of questions about this product at the following URL: https://us-cert.cisa.gov/forms/feedback/
Document FAQ
What is a MIFR? A Malware Initial Findings Report (MIFR) is intended to provide organizations with malware analysis in a timely manner. In most instances this report will provide initial indicators for computer and network defense. To request additional analysis, please contact CISA and provide information regarding the level of desired analysis.
What is a MAR? A Malware Analysis Report (MAR) is intended to provide organizations with more detailed malware analysis acquired via manual reverse engineering. To request additional analysis, please contact CISA and provide information regarding the level of desired analysis.
Can I edit this document? This document is not to be edited in any way by recipients. All comments or questions related to this document should be directed to the CISA at 1-888-282-0870 or CISA Service Desk.
Can I submit malware to CISA? Malware samples can be submitted via three methods:
CISA encourages you to report any suspicious activity, including cybersecurity incidents, possible malicious code, software vulnerabilities, and phishing-related scams. Reporting forms can be found on CISA’s homepage at www.cisa.gov.
Brought to you by Dr. Ware, Microsoft Office 365 Silver Partner, Charleston SC.
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